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Abstract
The purpose of this Article is to analyze, compare, and contrast New York’s law of intestacy
with that of the Uniform Probate Code (Code). The Article may serve as a basis for estimating
the impact on existing concepts of descent and distribution should New York adopt the Code. It
addresses itself to the law of intestate succession, delves into present New York law on the subject,
examines corresponding sections of the Code, analyzes the differences, and arrives at an evaluation
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that, on balance, the Code’s treatment of intestate succession is preferable to present New York
law.
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THE NEW YORK LAW OF INTESTATE
SUCCESSION COMPARED WITH THE
UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: WHERE
THERE'S NO WILL THERE'S A WAY
Julian R. Kossow*
I. Introduction
The purpose of this Article is to analyze, compare, and contrast
New York's law of intestacy with that of the Uniform Probate Code
(Code). The Article may serve as a basis for estimating the impact
on existing concepts of descent and distribution should New York
adopt the Code. It addresses itself to the law of intestate succession,
delves into present New York law on the subject, examines corre-
sponding sections of the Code, analyzes the differences, and arrives
at an evaluation of the benefits and detriments that adoption of the
Code would bring.
II. Distributive Patterns
Intestate succession is the statutory plan governing distribution
of a decedent's property as to which there has been no legally opera-
tive inter vivos or testamentary transfer. In New York, as in every
state, the distribution of an intestate estate, after taxes, expenses,
and debts have been satisfied, proceeds in accordance with a series
of legislatively mandated priorities. Few states have precisely the
same statutory scheme, yet most of them establish a pattern of
devolution of intestate property that roughly parallels New York's
arrangement.'
Quite naturally, the New York statute assigns top priority to the
* B.A. University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Georgetown University Law Center. Former law
clerk to the Honorable Walter M. Bastian, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, 1968-69. Mr. Kossow is a member of the firm of Stepke, Kossow, Trebon
& Stadtmueller, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The author is indebted to Mr. Patrick Moran, stu-
dent, Georgetown University Law Center, for his assistance with this article.
1. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 190, §§ 1-3 (Supp. 1975); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-1 to -5 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2105.06 (Page 1968). See generally Symposium on Succession to Property by Operation of
Law, 20 IOWA L. REV. 181 (1935).
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decedent's immediate family. If a spouse and child or children sur-
vive, they are entitled to inherit all of the intestate property.' Issue
of deceased children, taking per stirpes, are included in this hier-
archy. The spouse receives the first two thousand dollars3 plus one
half of the balance where only one child or issue of just one deceased
child survive;4 the child, of course, succeeds to the other half. The
spouse's share is reduced to the first two thousand dollars plus one-
third of the remainder in those cases where more than one child or
their issue outlive the decedent.5
To illustrate this distribution, assume that the intestate estate,
after expenses, debts and taxes, amounts to $38,000. If the spouse
and only one child survive, the spouse takes $20,000 and the child
inherits $18,000. Should this one child have predeceased the intes-
tate and have children surviving, these grandchildren of the dece-
dent will share equally the $18,000. If the spouse and more than one
child or their issue survive, the spouse's share is reduced to $14,000
and the remaining $24,000 is divided among the decedent's living
children and issue of predeceased children.
The New York statute enumerates further priorities. Where there
are issue but no spouse living at the time of the decedent's death,
the lineal descendants take the entire estate.' The converse does not
obtain. If a spouse survives and there are no issue, the spouse takes
the entire estate only if neither of the decedent's parents is alive at
that time.7 Assuming that there are no issue and that the spouse and
one or both of the decedent's parents survive, the spouse receives
the first twenty-five thousand dollars plus one-half of the residue;
the balance of the estate goes to the parent or parents.8 Using the
same $38,000 estate for purposes of illustration, the surviving
spouse's share is $31,500 while that of the parents is $6,500.
Siblings are the next class included in the statutory estate plan.
Brothers or sisters or their issue inherit all of the intestate property
where the decedent has left neither spouse, issue, nor parents.9
2. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1(a)(1), (2) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
3. This amount includes personal property not valued in excess of $2,000. Id.
4. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(2).
5. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(1).
6. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(6) (McKinney 1967); see In re Tash's Estate, 231 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sur. Ct.
1962).
7. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4.1.1(a)(5) (McKinney 1967).
8. Id. §§ 4-1.1(a)(3), (4). If there is no surviving spouse and no issue, the parent or parents
will take the whole estate. Id.
9. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(7).
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The next priority in the ever broadening hierarchy is accorded to
grandparents. They inherit the entire estate in the relatively rare
circumstance where spouse, descendants, parents, siblings, or their
issue all fail to survive the decedent.'" The legislative pecking order
mandates distribution, in the absence of grandparents, to their
issue." At this level, the method of distribution is no longer by
representation. Rather, the rights of issue of grandparents to suc-
ceed is determined by degree of kinship; those of the nearest degree
take all in preference to those of more remote degree. The degree of
kinship is calculated by "exclusion of the decedent and the counting
of each person in the chain of ascent to and including the common
ancestor, and then the counting downward of each subsequent des-
cendant from the common ancestor to the claimant."' 2
By way of illustration, assume that the decedent's next of kin are
two aunts and several first cousins. The two aunts, being three
degrees of kinship from the decedent, inherit the entire estate in
preference to the first cousins who are four degrees distant. Since
the two aunts are of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, they
share equally the intestate distribution.'3 The first cousins, even if
they are children of predeceased aunts or uncles, take nothing be-
cause inheritance by representation does not extend this far."
Recently New York has provided for inheritance by great-
grandparents or their issue where they alone survive.'5 This distribu-
tion is of very limited significance as it only applies in cases where
the decedent, at the time of his death, was an infant or an adjudged
incompetent. However statistically improbable, were this to occur
and great-grandparents or their issue be the nearest relatives, then
the dispositive pattern is similar in all respects to that made in favor
of grandparents.
Part 1 of Article II of the Uniform Probate Code presents the
proposed law of intestate succession. Section 2-101 delineates the
reach of the statute: "Any part of the estate of a decedent not
10. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(8). Grandparents occupied the same position in intestate succession
under earlier New York law. Bogert v. Furman, 10 Paige 496, 500 (Ch. 1843).
11. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(8) (McKinney 1967); see In re
Willingham's Estate, 51 Misc. 2d 516, 273 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sur. Ct. 1966).
12. In re Wendel's Will, 143 Misc. 480, 483, 257 N.Y.S. 87, 90 (Sur. Ct. 1932).
13. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(8)(b) (McKinney 1967).
1 4. Per stirpes distribution is allowed only with regard to decedent's issue, siblings, or
issue of siblings. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(8)(c).
15. Id. § 4-1.1(a)(9) (McKinney Supp. 1975), quoted in In re Estate of Schaefer, 76 Misc.
2d 488, 490, 351 N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
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effectively disposed of by his will passes to his heirs . . . ."' Thus,
the Code obliterates ancient distinctions between distributive pat-
terns of real and personal property and directs similar treatment for
all of the decedent's property not validly transferred by will. 7
The Code then allocates the estate among the survivors. Section
2-102 prescribes the intestate share of the surviving spouse, who is
the sole heir if neither issue nor parent.of the decedent survives. 8
Should there be issue, all of whom are descendants of the surviving
spouse, the spouse inherits the "first [$50,000], plus one-half of the
balance of the intestate estate."'" If one or more of the decedent's
.surviving issue are not also issue of the surviving spouse, the latter's
share decreases to one-half of the intestate estate; the spouse loses
the right to the first $50,000.20 Finally, where one or both parents,
but no issue of the decedent survive, the spouse is entitled to the
first $50,000 and one-half of the remainder of the intestate estate.2'
The Code's distribution to the surviving spouse differs substan-
tially from the New York law. Using the same example of an intes-
tate estate with $38,000 available after debts and taxes and assum-
ing that a spouse and one child survive, in New York the spouse
receives $20,000, while under the Code the spouse inherits the whole
$38,000. Should two or more children survive along with the spouse,
the latter's share in New York drops to $14,000. In contrast, were
the Code in effect, the spouse would still be entitled to the entire
$38,000. Even if the intestate estate available for distribution to
next of kin is much larger, the differences between the Code and
New York law remain significant. Assume that the estate, net of
taxes, debts, and expenses, amounts to $182,000 and that the spouse
16. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-101.
17. Id. art. II, pt. 1, General Comment.
18. Section 2-102 (Share of the Spouse) of the Uniform Probate Code (Code) reads as
follows:
The intestate share of the surviving spouse is:
(1) if there is no surviving issue or parent of the decedent, the entire intestate estate;
(2) if there is no surviving issue but the decedent is survived by a parent or parents,
the first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
(3) if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the surviving spouse also, the
first [$50,000], plus one-half of the balance of the intestate estate;
(4) if there are surviving issue one or more of whom are not issue of the surviving
spouse, one-half of the intestate estate.
19. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-102(3).
20. Id. § 2-102(4).
21. Id. § 2-102(2).
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and one child survive. In New York the spouse inherits $92,000 while
his or her share under the Code is $116,000. Should two or more
children survive and, as in each of the above examples, all of the
children are also issue of the surviving spouse, the spouse's Code
share continues to be $116,000, but under New York law it would
be reduced to.$62,000.
It is submitted that adoption, vel non, of the Code's law of intes-
tate succession should stand or fall on a critique of section 2-102.
The primary effect of New York's legislative acceptance of this part
of the Code would be an increase in the intestate share of the surviv-
ing spouse. Thus, the burden is on the Code to justify the enhanced
portion allotted to the surviving spouse.
The comment to section 2-102 states that the plan thereof "re-
flects the desires of most married persons, who almost always leave
all of a moderate estate or at least one-half of a larger estate to the
surviving spouse when a will is executed."2 To sustain the validity
of the Code's rationale, it must be assumed that (1) the so-called
intestate intent is accurately mirrored by analysis of what is done
by those who do leave wills and (2) effectuation of such intent ought
to be the motivating factor in the statutory pattern of distribution.
As to the first question, whether analysis of testate distributions
is a valid indicator of the intent of those who die without wills, the
Code's general comment preceding the sections on intestacy states
that "[tlhe Code attempts to reflect the normal desire of the owner
of wealth as to disposition of his property at death, and for this
purpose the prevailing patterns in wills are-useful in determining
what the owner who fails to execute a will would probably want."23
The comment presumes the validity of the correlation; the Code
offers no explanation of its position or of the factors that may, and
probably do, differentiate the intent of those who die with and with-
out wills. In defense of the Code this assumption is an instinctive
one for which there exists some supporting evidence.2"
22. Id. § 2-102, Comment.
23. Id. art. II, pt. 1, General Comment.
24. See M. SUSSMAN, J. CATER & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND. INHERITANCE 44 (1970);
Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30 U. CHI.
L. REV. 241, 260-63 (1963). Both of these studies analyzed the distributive patterns of a large
number of wills and found variation from intestate statutes. In the Dunham study, one
hundred percent of those testators survived by spouse and children left the entire estate to
the spouse. Dunham, supra at 252. Sussman's group found that, when a spouse and lineal
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The more difficult question is (2); whether patterns of descent
and distribution ought to be predicated on the fiction of effectuating
the decedent's intent. For myriad reasons, be they psychological,
sociological, emotional, or intellectual, be they derived from ennui
or even laziness,25 each individual decedent has not expressed his
intent. Why should millions of dollars worth of property be trans-
ferred in thousands of situations where no intent has been articu-
lated? The point here is not to question such transfers but to exam-
ine their rationale.
Rather than using the presumed intent of the decedent as the
primary rationale for laws of intestate succession, it would be prefer-
able to recognize that no intent has been expressed and, for what-
ever reason, the individual has left the latter to be decided by so-
ciety.2" At the least,27 society's interest is the transfer of family prop-
kindred survived, eighty-five percent of all testators left everything to the spouse. SUSSMAN,
supra at 89.
Age and financial differences between those who die with and without wills were also noted.
These statistics indicate that persons who die intestate are typically younger and less wealthy
than those who execute wills. SUSSMAN, supra at 62-82; Dunham, supra at 242-45, 248-51.
However, attempts, based on the information contained in these studies, to recast intestacy
laws have not adequately taken into account the effect of such distinctions. In addition to
the differing characteristics of testate and intestate decedents, the very implications of voli-
tion in a will situation are often overlooked.
The analogy of the dispositions made by testators is some answer, but not a conclusive
one. It must be remembered that the testator who leaves his estate to his widow does
so knowing the facts, and knowing his widow. In making a universal "will" the law
ignores these factors, and there are good grounds for the law being more cautious than
an individual dealing with his own property at his own risks.
Mitchell, Report of the Committee on Intestate Succession, 14 MODERN L. REV. 478, 480
(1951). Therefore the reliability of will surveys as a guideline to intestate "intent" remains
open to question.
25. "Further, it seems probable that most intestates die as such, not because they are
satisfied with the provisions the law makes for them but simply because they have never got
round to making a will." Mitchell, supra note 24, at 480.
26. One commentator has stated:
Intestacy is in fact mostly "chosen" only by default. It is a statutory plan adopted by
government and imposed for social rather than individualistic reasons on all those who
do not make use of volitional alternatives.
Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society,
1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 355.
27. Remarkably diverse commentators have advocated a more confiscatory approach by
society. "The portion [of the earth] occupied by any individual ceases to be his when he
himself ceases to be, and reverts to society." T. JEFFERSON, JEFFERSON'S WORKS 454 (Monti-
cello ed. _). "Inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of this generation
as inherited political power was inconsistent with the ideals of the generation which estab-
lished our Government." K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 30
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erty so as to maintain the family as a secure unit. Society, through
state legislatures, may well decide that the 'best way of transferring
intestate assets so as to preserve the security of the family survivors
is to channel all of the property to the spouse, trusting that he or
she will make appropriate provisions for any children or elderly
dependents."8 Or, the interests of society may better be served by
the Code's scheme of devolution in which the surviving spouse's
share is greatly enhanced vis-a-vis traditional patterns of distribu-
tion. Irrespective of whether societal interest or reflection of the
average intestate's intent offers the better rationale, the present
New York practice of distributing two-thirds of the estate to chil-
dren has distinct disadvantages. Several of the reasons against leav-
ing only one-third of the estate to the spouse are: (1) where the
children are grown, they may well be in a better position to care for
themselves financially than is the spouse; (2) where the children are
young, the surviving spouse usually becomes the financial guardian
and is frequently burdened by the cumbersome formalities of man-
aging the family assets; 9 and (3) a one-third share for the spouse
seems incompatible with the fundamental concept of marriage as a
partnership.
Concerning the question of whether there are compelling reasons
for the present New York policy, the answer is no. New York, along
with the rest of the colonies, modeled its rules of intestate succession
after-the English Statute of Distribution of 1670,30 in which the
(1948). While legislatures have the power to abolish inheritance by the family, Irving Trust
Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1941) ("the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance"),
the exercise of such power beyond present schemes of taxation is undesirable.
28. Recent legislation indicates that a slight trend in this direction is discernible.
[Iln three of the five states that have adopted substantially all of UPC, the enact-
ments go farther than UPC in making the spouse the sole heir. Thus, in the Alaska,
Colorado, and Arizona enactments of UPC, local draftsmen eliminated the decedent's
parents as heirs when a spouse survived.
RESPONSE OF THE JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD TO THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA'S "UNIFORM PROBATE
CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE" 3-4 (1974).
29. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-102, Comment:
[In the small estate (less than $50,000 after homestead allowance, exempt property,
and allowances) the surviving spouse is given the entire estate if there are only children
who are issue of both the decedent and the surviving spouse; the result is to avoid
protective proceedings as to property otherwise passing to their minor children.
30. 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10. For the adoption of the English statute in New York, see In re
Youngs, 73 Misc. 335, 132 N.Y.S. 689 (Sur. Ct. 1911); Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per
Capita, 1946 Wis. L. REV. 3, 22-27. While the English rule applied only to personalty, realty
being governed by the doctrine of primogeniture, many American jurisdictions soon rejected
19761
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widow and children were entitled respectively to one-third and two-
thirds of the decedent's personalty. The English statute itself codi-
fied that which, by 1670, had been common law for generations.'
Thus does a 20th century New York law patterned after a 17th
century English law that itself drew on the values of a 13th century
agrarian society attempt to serve the needs of families living in
today's socioeconomic environment. While traditional policies are
not necessarily inapplicable to present circumstances, the fact that
these are laws founded on ancient notions is certainly not a compel-
ling reason for their continuance today.
Concluding the critique of section 2-102, it is submitted that more
generous treatment of the surviving spouse (1) will better advance
society's interest in protecting the immediate family, (2) may better
approximate the intent of the average intestate," and (3) is not met
with convincing arguments that justify retention of the existing
statute. Adoption in New York of section 2-102 clearly would be a
substantial improvement on present law.
With regard to its treatment of the other surviving members of
the decedent's family the Uniform Probate Code's system of devolu-
tion of intestate property contains, with a few exceptions, relatively
minor variations from New York law. Section 2-1031 disposes of that
this distinction. T. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 3 (2d ed. 1953). This
decision to discard primogeniture may have been motivated by economic and philosphic
needs of the colonies. Andrews, The Influence of Colonial Conditions as Illustrated in the
Connecticut Intestacy Law, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 431, 436
(1907). New York, however, did not abolish primogeniture until 1786, Morris, Primogeniture
and Entailed Estates in America, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 24, 25 n.17 (1927), and did not treat
personalty and realty in the same manner until 1929, Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [19291
N.Y. Laws 504 (now N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967), as amended,
(McKinney Supp. 1975)).
31. While the early history of intestacy laws is obscure, Gross, The Medieval Law of
Intestacy, 18 HARV. L. REV. 120 (1904), there was a medieval development in the law of wills
that foreshadowed the rules of succession. Under early common law a testator could only will
one-third of his personalty if he was survived by his wife and issue, the wife taking one-third
and the issue one-third. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 550-54. If only the wife
or only the issue survived, one-half of the estate could be claimed. These rights, enforceable
by the writ de rationabili parte bonorum, analogous to a forced share, gradually lost their
place in English law. However, there is little question that they formed the basic framework
of intestacy law from the 13th to the 17th century. Id. at 554-63. The portion of an intestate's
personalty over and above the shares of widow and children was called "the dead man's part."
Originally to be "distributed for the benefit of his soul," this part could fund the saying of
masses or maintenance of roads. Gross, supra at 128 & n.4.
32. But see note 24 supra.
33. Section 2-103 (Share of Heirs Other Than Surviving Spouse) of the Code reads as
follows:
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part of the intestate estate not inherited by the surviving spouse, or
all of the estate where there is no spouse. The property passes in
accordance with a series of priorities, the first of which is the issue
of the decedent. Lineal descendants take the entire estate in prefer-
ence to any other relatives (again, the rest of this discussion relates
only to property not designated for the surviving spouse). Irrespec-
tive of whether the issue are the decedent's children or grandchil-
dren or even great-grandchildren, they share equally so long as they
are of the same degree of kinship. However, where they are of une-
qual degree, those further down the line take by representation. 4
Assume that the intestate is survived by two daughters and three
grandchildren, children of a predeceased son. The two daughters
each fall heir to one-third of the estate and the three grandchildren
are each entitled to one-ninth of the property, in effect, sharing
equally their deceased father's one-third interest.
The next priority is accorded to the decedent's parents. If either
or both parents, but no issue, survive, the parent or parents inherit
everything above and beyond the spouse's share."8 The Code contin-
ues the practice observed in many states preferring all lineal descen-
dants to any lineal ascendants. In the great majority of cases, where
the beneficiaries are children or grandchildren, the result is justi-
fied, if for no other reason than instinct. However, in the statisti-
The part of the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse under Section 2-
102, or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows:
(1) to the issue of the decedent; if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the
decedent they take equally, but if of unequal degree, then those of more remote degree
take by representation;
(2) if there is no surviving issue, to his parent or parents equally;
(3) if there is no surviving issue or parent, to the brothers and sisters and the issue
of each deceased brother or sister by representation; if there is no surviving brother or
sister, the issue of brothers and sisters take equally if they are all of the same degree
of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal degree then those of more remote degree
take by representation;
(4) if there is no surviving issue, parent or issue of a parent, but the decedent is
survived by one or more grandparents or issue of grandparents, half of the estate passes
to the paternal grandparents if both survive, or to the surviving paternal grandparent,
or to the issue of the paternal grandparents if both are deceased, the issue taking
equally if they are all of the same degree of kinship to the decedent, but if of unequal
degree those of more remote degree take by representation; and the other half passes
to the maternal relatives in the same manner; but if there be no surviving grandparent
or issue of grandparent on either the paternal or the maternal side, the entire estate
passes to the relatives on the other side in the same manner as the half.
34. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103(l).
35. Id. § 2-103(2).
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cally rare cases where the nearest lineal descendants are great-
grandchildren, it seems absurd that the law passes everything down
to beneficiaries that are three generations down the line without
providing anything for the decedent's parents, especially since the
parents would, at the least, have to be in their mid-seventies."6
In the absence of any lineal descendants or parents, the estate
goes to the decedent's brothers and sisters and issue of any deceased
siblings by representation.37 Should no siblings survive the intes-
tate, the descendants of brothers and sisters divide the estate
equally unless they are not of the same degree of relationship to the
decedent, in which case those of more remote degree inherit by
representation. Thus, if the decedent's closest surviving relatives
are two nieces and one nephew, the estate is divided three ways.
Change the example and assume that the decedent's next of kin are
two nieces and two grandnephews who are sons of a predeceased
nephew. Now each niece inherits one-third of the estate and each
of the grandnephews is entitled to a one-sixth share.
The last priority mandated by section 2-103 occurs when the clos-
est surviving relatives are the decedent's grandparents or their
issue. In such cases, the estate is distributed half and half through
the paternal and maternal grandparent lines.38 If, for example, both
paternal grandparents die leaving children, the paternal aunts and
uncles share equally that one-half of the estate alloted to the pater-
nal side. Should any of the paternal aunts or uncles predecease the
decedent and leave issue, the latter, first cousins to the decedent,
share the interest allotted to their predeceased parent. Finally, in
the event that there is neither a surviving grandparent nor issue
of a grandparent on one of the two sides, then the one-half of the
estate designated for that side passes to relatives on the other side.
It is apparent that with regard to the share of heirs other than the
surviving spouse, the Code and New York law are quite similar.
Under the Code the enhanced portion for the spouse decreases the
share assigned to children or parents of the decedent, depending
upon the particular combination of survivors. Once the spouse is
removed from the picture, both the Code and New York law create
36. One possible reason for this preference is to avoid the tax on successive transfers of
the property that would result from inheritance by the older person. This may be a case of
tax considerations restraining the development of a more socially desirable distribution.
37. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-103(3).
38. Id. § 2-103(4).
[Vol. IV
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priorities first to issue, then to parents, then to siblings or their
lineal descendants and finally to grandparents or their issue. New
York's provision for great-grandparents or their issue 9 will so rarely
be relevant that the Code's termination of inheritance beyond the
line of grandparents and their issue is not a substantial deviation
from New York law. Both statutes "simplifqy] proof of heirship and
eliminate will contests by remote relatives"" by essentially limiting
inheritance to grandparents and their issue.
Two substantive differences between New York's and the Code's
dispositive patterns should be mentioned. The first relates to the
Code's extension of per stirpes distribution to issue of grandparents.
In contradistinction, New York uses the civil law computation-of-
degrees method. To illustrate the difference, assume that the intes-
tate's nearest relatives are three aunts and one first cousin, the son
of a predeceased uncle. In New York, the three aunts, three degrees
removed, would each inherit one-third of the estate; the first
cousin, being four degrees distant from the decedent would be
excluded. Analyzing the same example under the Code, the first
cousin would be entitled, by representation, to his predeceased
father's one-fourth share and the portion of each aunt would be
one-fourth rather than one-third.
The second substantive difference concerns the Code's half and
half allocation to maternal and paternal grandparents or their issue.
Using the preceding hypothetical assume that the first cousin, son
of the decedent's predeceased uncle, is on the paternal side of the
family and the three aunts are on the maternal side. The Code
distribution would be one-sixth to each of the aunts and one-half to
the cousin. As seen above, in New York the cousin would be ex-
cluded. Apart from these two instances, Code section 2-103 would
not significantly alter New York law.
III. Survivorship
An apothegm of the common law of descent and distribution de-
clares that to be an heir one must survive the decedent. However,
establishing the fact of survivorship has become more difficult as
39. The purpose behind this extension of intestate succession where the decedent was an
infant or an adjudged incompetent is to broaden the class of potential distributees when the
decedent is unable to execute a will. In re Estate of Schaefer, 76 Misc. 2d 488, 490, 351
N.Y.S.2d 312, 315 (Sur. Ct. 1973) (dictum).
40. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, art. II, pt. 1, General Comment.
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multiple deaths in transportation accidents have increased. To rem-
edy this problem of proof, New York adopted the Uniform Simulta-
neous Death Act in 1944. 1 For the purpose of determining one's
heirs, the statute provides that, where there is "no sufficient evi-
dence that the persons have died otherwise than simultaneously,"
each person shall be deemed to have survived the others..2
One major drawback of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is
its failure to alleviate the burden of complex factual investigations
into the question of survivorship for an instant. The answer to this
question can have a profound effect on the statutory scheme of
distribution. In New York proof that an individual survived by one
second will suffice to qualify that person as an heir.
Hoping to eliminate intricate evidentiary problems that too fre-
quently invite hypothetical answers," the drafters of the Uniform
Probate Code created a requirement in section 2-104 that, to be an
heir, one must survive the decedent by 120 hours.5 The Code's
unstated premise seems to be that those who survive an accident for
five days are likely to live substantially longer. If survival for five
days cannot be established, then, as in the Uniform Simultaneous
Death Act, there is a presumption that the potential heir does not
inherit.
41. N. Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.6 (McKinney 1967).
42. Id. § 2-1.6(a).
43. In re Di Bella's Estate, 199 Misc. 847, 856, 100 N.Y.S.2d 763,770 (Sur. Ct. 1950), aff'd,
279 App. Div. 689, 107 N.Y.S.2d 929 (3d Dep't 1951). In this case all the members of a family
were found dead due to asphyxiation by gas. The order of survivorship was established by
the relative states of decomposition of the bodies and the asthmatic condition of one of the
victims. Id. at 854-55, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69.
44. See In re Moore's Will, 14 Misc. 2d 85, 178 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (Sur. Ct. 1958) (double
murder and suicide; order of death of trust beneficiaries determined by need for murderer to
reload revolver, number of wounds in bodies, and other circumstantial evidence).
45. Section 2-104 (Requirement That Heir Survive Decedent for 120 Hours) of the Code
reads as follows:
Any person who fails to survive the decedent by 120 hours is deemed to have prede-
ceased the decedent for the purposes of homestead allowance, exempt property and
intestate succession, and the decedent's heirs are determined accordingly. If the time
of death of the decedent or of the person who would otherwise be an heir, or the times
of death of both, cannot be determined, and it cannot be established that the person
who would otherwise be an heir has survived the decedent by 120 hours, it is deemed
that the person failed to survive for the required period. This section is not to be
applied where its application would result in a taking of intestate estate by the state
under Section 2-105.
A similar provision was adopted in Ohio prior to the promulgation of the Code. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2105.21 (Page 1968) (30-day survival requirement). There is a similar require-
ment in the Code for those who would take under a will. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-601.
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The Code's requirement of extended survivorship also rectifies a
second failing of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act-succession
by a surviving spouse who in turn survives but a brief time, then
dies leaving both estates to his or her collateral relatives. For exam-
ple, if a childless couple were involved in an automobile accident,
both dying intestate with no parents surviving, and the wife lived
only a day longer than her husband, under current New York law
the wife's relatives would receive the whole of the couple's property
and the husband's family would inherit nothing. Under the Code,
the wife would not qualify as her husband's heir. Thus his property
would pass to his family and the wife's property would devolve to
hers. This distribution not only approximates the husband's intent
had he foreseen the brief survival of his wife, but also produces a
more equitable result.
A potential impediment to the adoption of section 2-104 is its
interrelationship with the major estate tax concern, the marital
deduction.4" If the spouse does survive for 120 hours and qualifies
as an heir, the deduction is still available. However, if the spouse
does not survive for 120 hours, the marital deduction is lost. The
drafters of the Code are of the opinion that, considering the size of
most intestate estates, the loss of the deduction is outweighed by the
potential benefit this section confers should one spouse die shortly
after the other.47
One exception to the entire plan of section 2-104 arises when
disqualification of a person as an heir would result in an escheat to
the State. In this event the person attains the status of an heir even
though he fails to survive the decedent by the requisite 120 hours.
Balance the evidentiary considerations and the likelihood of more
equitable distributions against the potential loss of some estate tax
benefits. The Code's requirement of survivorship is to be preferred
to the corresponding law of New York.
IV. Escheat
Section 2-105 of the Uniform Probate Code directs that, "[ilf
there is no taker under the provisions of this Article, the intestate
46. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056. Conditions requiring survivorship for up to six months
will not result in disqualification of the interest passed for the marital deduction. Id. §
2056(b)(3).
47. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-104, Comment.
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estate passes to the [state]."'" This statement is also declarative
of New York law." The only difference between proposed and pres-
ent law is that escheat can, in theory, occur earlier under the Code.
If the nearest relative is beyond the line of grandparents or their
issue, for example a great-uncle, under the Code the state will al-
ways take in preference to the "heir." In New York, there is a possi-
bility that the great-uncle could inherit. This would happen only
where the decedent was an infant or an adjudged incompetent at the
time of his death." Thus, the impact of section 2-105 on New York
law would be negligible.
V. Representation
Representation is the process by which issue of a predeceased
relative of the decedent inherit the share such relative would have
obtained had he survived. In New York the devolution of intestate
property by representation is limited to the decedent's lineal des-
cendants and to siblings and their issue." Here the statute directs
distribution per stirpes,52 with the added proviso that where the
distributees are equally related to the decedent their shares are
equal .13
Most states mandate distribution per stirpes, but the question
remains at what generational level is the primary division effected.
Some states respond by making the primary division at the level of
familial relationship that is closest to the decedent, irrespective of
whether anyone of that status is alive." Each succeeding generation
then takes by representation. To illustrate this arrangement, as-
sume that the decedent is survived only by two nephews who are
children of a predeceased brother and by one niece who is the child
of a predeceased sister. There are no siblings living and no others
48. Id. § 2-105.
49. New York requires escheat of real property, N.Y. ABAND. PROP. LAW § 200 (McKinney
1944), and personal property, In re Hammond's Estate, 2 App. Div. 2d 160, 154 N.Y.S.2d 820
(2d Dep't 1956), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 567, 147 N.E.2d 777, 170 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1958), if there are no
heirs to the property.
50. See text accompanying notes 15, 39 supra.
51. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1(a)(1), (2), (6), (7), (c) (McKinney 1967),
as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1975).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 4-1.1(b) (McKinney 1967).
54. See, e.g., In re Estate of Frear, 180 Cal. App. 2d 829, 4 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1960); In re
Estate of Davol, 100 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (acknowledging that this is the
minority rule); Appeal of Messier, 97 N.J. Eq. 271, 127 A. 85 (Prerogative Ct. 1924).
[Vol. IV
19761 INTESTATE SUCCESSION
have died leaving issue. The basic division would be at the brother-
sister level; the property would pass by representation, one-half to
the niece and one-fourth to each nephew.
However, New York, exemplifying the majority of American juris-
dictions,55 would divide the estate differently. The New York prac-
tice is to go to the nearest relationship where someone is alive and
make the primary division at that generational level, all others tak-
ing by representation. In the preceding example, the basic division
would be made at the niece and nephew level and each of the sur-
vivors would inherit one-third of the estate.
The Uniform Probate Code prescribes a similar pattern of distri-
bution. Section 2-106 states:57
If representation is called for by this Code, the estate is divided into as
many shares as there are surviving heirs in the nearest degree of kinship and
deceased persons in the same degree who left issue who survive the decedent,
each surviving heir in the nearest degree receiving one share and the share
of each deceased person in the same degree being divided among his issue in
the same manner.
Both the Code and New York emphasize the equal treatment of
people who are equally related to the decedent. The only significant
difference between the two systems is the Code's extension of inheri-
tance by representation to issue of grandparents. 5 New York dis-
55. See, e.g., In re Reil's Estate, 70 Idaho 64, 211 P.2d 407 (1949) (Idaho's recent adoption
of the Code reinforces this position); Parett v. Paul, 115 Ohio App. 488,185 N.E.2d 798 (1962);
In re Le Roux's Estate, 55 Wash.2d 889, 350 P.2d 1001 (1960). On the subject of per stirpes
and per capita generally, see Page, Descent Per Stirpes and Per Capita, 1946 WiS. L. REV. 3.
56. In re Nunziato's Estate, 202 N.Y.S.2d 39 (Sur. Ct. 1960); In re McKeon's Estate, 25
Misc. 2d 850, 199 N.Y.S.2d 158 (Sur. Ct. 1960).
57. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-106.
58. There is another instance in which the Code's definition of representation would
produce a distribution different from that of New York. Assume the intestate is survived only
by a daughter and three great-grandchildren who are grandchildren of a predeceased son. The
Code would first divide the estate at the nearest degree of kinship at which an heir survives.
This would be the level of the intestate's children; the daughter would take one-half and the
other half would be divided among the predeceased son's issue "in the same manner." By
using this phrase, the Code sanctions a later per capita division after the first allocation of
shares. In our example, since no one on the level of intestate's grandchildren survives, the
three great-grandchildren inherit equal, one-sixth shares of the estate. In New York and
virtually all other jurisdictions, one would need to know the number of grandchildren and
their respective offspring before shares could be allocated per stirpes to the intestate's great-
grandchildren. If the three great-grandchildren were descended, one from a predeceased
grandchild, and two from another predeceased grandchild, their shares, by representation,
would be respectively one-quarter, one-eighth, and one-eighth. See Waggoner, A Proposed
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tributes to issue of grandparents on a winner-take-all basis; those
in the nearest degree of kinship inherit the estate.
Given the posture of distant inheritance, beyond the immediate
family, among the decedent's aunt s, uncles, first cousins, and first
cousins once removed, it seems preferable to distribute intestate
property widely rather than to a select few.5" Thus, the change sec-
tion 2-106 would bring to New York is both slight and salutary.
VI. Half Blood Kindred
If two persons have but one natural parent in common they are
half blood siblings. 0 Accordingly, the descendants of such persons
will be relatives of the half blood. With the incidence of divorce on
the rise, it follows that half blood relationships occur more fre-
quently. Elimination of distinctions between half blood and whole
blood relatives has a beneficial effect in that it may reduce tensions
within the family. For purposes of intestate succession, both New
York"' and the Uniform Probate Code's section 2-107,11 in wording
that is virtually identical, treat half blood relatives of the decedent
as if they were of the whole blood. 3
VII. Afterborn Heirs
Traditionally, an unborn person's property rights come into exist-
ence at the moment of conception providing that person is later born
Alternative to the Uniform Probate Code's System for Intestate Distribution Among
Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 626, 630-31 (1971).
59. Both systems are flawed in some instances. A seeming inequity under the Code would
be a maternal aunt sharing an estate equally with a paternal first cousin twice removed.
Under New York's approach, a paternal uncle could take all in preference to fifteen maternal
first cousins. While no system is infallible with regard to all possible combinations of survi-
vors, error in favor of a wider class of distributees appears to be the lesser evil.
60. Parett v. Paul, 115 Ohio App. 488, 491, 185 N.E.2d 798, 800 (1962).
61. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(d) (McKinney 1967).
62. "Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of
the whole blood." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-107.
63. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 11 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 4 (1969);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:4-6 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3(3) (1966). But see CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 254 (West 1,956) ("ancestral estates"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.105 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975)
(half blood relatives take half-shares when heirs include those of whole blood); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 1.04.035 (Supp. 1975) ("ancestral estates"). The "ancestral estates" rule, which
denies half blood relatives a share in property the decedent derived from an ancestor unless
the half blood was also of that ancestor's blood, was applied by New York until 1929 when
the current statute was enacted. Act of April 1, 1929. ch. 229, § 6, [1929] N.Y. Laws 504
(now N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 1967), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1975)).
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alive. 4 Similarly, the right of an unborn: child to inherit attaches at
conception if that child is later born alive. While some states will
only preserve intestate rights for unborn children who are issue of
the decedent,"9 both New York6 and the Uniform Probate Code's
section 2-10811 protect a larger class of unborn persons. Collateral
relatives' unborn offspring, assuming they are born alive, are within
the ambit of these statutes. New York extends the right to inherit
to those "distributees" conceived before decedent's death and "born
alive" thereafter, 8 while the Code allows "relatives" conceived be-
fore decedent's death and "born" thereafter to share in the estate."
"Relatives" seems more precise than "distributees," but "born
alive" is more exact than "born." New York's protective policy to-
ward all heirs en ventre sa mere would continue unchanged under
the Code's formulation.
VIII. Adoption
Since 1887, New York has allowed an adopted child and an adop-
tive parent to inherit from each other. 0 Until recently, however,
these rights had not precluded dual inheritance; after adoption the
child could still take from and through his natural parents.7 Desir-
64. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130.
65. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (Spec. Pamphlet 1975) (afterborn issue); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 13 (1965) (afterborn child); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 8 (1969) (afterborn
child).
66. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(e) (McKinney 1967).
67. "Relatives of the decedent conceived before his death but born thereafter inherit as if
they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108.
68. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(e) (McKinney 1967).
69. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-108. Would a child born within 120 hours of the decedent's
death have to survive for the remainder of the 120 hours to satisfy the requirements of section
2-104 and qualify as an heir? The answer appears to be yes. Section 2-108 treats the afterborn
heir as if he were born in the lifetime of the decedent and section 2-104 requires any heir to
survive for 120 hours after the decedent's death.
70. Act of June 25, 1887, ch. 703, [1887] N.Y. Laws 909. This statute also gave the child's
heirs and the next of kin the right to inherit from the adoptive parent. The statute was
construed to provide inheritance rights for children adopted from institutions. United States
Trust Co. v. Hoyt, 150 App. Div. 621, 135 N.Y.S. 849 (1st Dep't 1912). For a history of
adoption and inheritance in New York, see 38 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 380 (1964).
71. Act of April 9, 1938, ch. 606, § 1, [1938] N.Y. Laws 1615; Act of April 22, 1915, ch.
352, § 1, 119151 N.Y. Laws 1068. In fact, involvement with the natural family was greater
since the child could not take from relatives of his adoptive parents. Hopkins v..Hopkins,
202 App. Div. 606, 195 N.Y.S. 605 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 545, 142 N.E. 277
(1923). This was thought to reflect the absence of consent by the relatives to the adoptive
parent's decision. However, these relatives could inherit from the child. In re Estate of
Hollstein, 251 App. Div. 771, 295 N.Y.S. 598 (3d Dep't 1937) (per curiam).
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ous of "placing the adopted child so far as possible within the blood-
lines of his new family for inheritance purposes,"" the New York
legislature severed the remaining ties of succession between natural
family and adopted child and further strengthened the relationship
with the adoptive family by granting the child the right to inherit
from his adoptive parents' relatives. 3 The first change, eliminating
the natural family, is subject to exception where a natural parent
consents to the adoption of the child by such parent's spouse. Due
to ambiguous phrasing, this exception was interpreted to preserve
intestate succession rights in and from both natural parents." Clari-
fying the legislative intent, a later amendment provided that the
only time an adopted child and his natural parent will share inheri-
tance rights is when the natural parent is married to an adoptive
parent of the child." With this one qualification, present New York
rules of descent and distribution declare that an adopted child
stands with his adoptive parents as if he were a natural child.
Cognizant of the psychological and sociological importance of
transplanting the child as completely as possible into the adopting
family, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code structured a simi-
lar provision. In section 2-109(1) TM the adopted person is considered
the child of the adopting parent and not of the natural parents," but
72. In re Bankers Trust Co., 31 N.Y.2d 322, 327-28, 291 N.E.2d 137, 139-40, 338 N.Y.S.2d
895, 898 (1972).
73. Act of April I6, 1963, ch. 406, § 1, [19631 N.Y. Laws 1788 (codified at N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
74. In re Karron's Will, 52 Misc. 2d 367, 275 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sur. Ct. 1966). The statute
at this time provided that if adoption by a spouse occurred there would be no effect on the
rights of child and consenting spouse "to inherit from and through each other and their
natural and adopted kindred." Act of April 16, 1963, ch. 406, § 1, [1963] N.Y. Laws 1788,
as amended, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1975) (emphasis added).
75. Act of March 8, 1966, ch.'14, § 1, [1966] N.Y. Laws 35 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 117 (McKinney Supp. 1975)).
76. Section 2-109(l) of the Code reads as follows:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be
established to determine succession by, through, or from a person,
(1) an adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural
parents except that adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect
on the relationship between the child and that natural parent.
77. Section 2-109 of the Code is also important as a reference point for section 2-611 of
the Code, which adopts the intestate succession definitions of "child" in order to construe
generic terms in wills. This treatment is paralleled in New York where an adopted child will
be treated as a natural child in determining the members of a class referred to as "children,"
"issue," etc., in a will. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.3(a)(1) (McKinney 1967); see
In re Bankers Trust Co., 31 N.Y.2d 322, 291 N.E.2d 137, 338 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1972); In re
Grace's Will, 46 Misc. 2d 878, 261 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Sur. Ct. 1965).
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there is an exception to prevent the adoption from altering the in-
heritance rights between the child and that natural parent whose
spouse is adopting the child."8
There is a possibility that this latter position will be modified.
The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code has recom-
mended that the Uniform Law Commissioners adopt a revised ver-
sion of section 2-109(1). The proposed amendment would alter the
exception to provide that, when the spouse of a natural parent
adopts the child, inheritance from, through, or by both natural par-
ents will be preserved." The policy of protecting the child from
traumatic revelations of his former family may be inapplicable here.
The continued presence of one natural parent increases the likeli-
hood that the child knows the details of his past and that ties with
relatives of the other natural parent still exist.
One further distinction between section 2-109(1) and current New
York law involves the right of prior adoptive parents where the child
is adopted a second time. While the policies of both the Code and
the law of New York favor limiting inheritance rights of the adopted
child to only one family, the New York statute may more readily be
construed to reach that result. Section 117 of New York's Domestic
Relations Law, while not explicitly stopping inheritance from or by
prior adoptive parents, does so by implication." The Code termi-
nates only the relationship with natural parents; it does not address
itself to the question of prior adoptive parents. Two commentators
have criticized the Code's lack of clarity on this point.8 ' To imple-
ment fully the single-family policy, the Code should eliminate prior
adoptive parents from any inheritance scheme subject to the usual
exception where the child is adopted by the new spouse of the prior
adoptive parent.
78. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(1).
79. UPC NOTES, No. 12, at 4 (June 1975).
80. The New York statute provides an exception to the loss of inheritance rights where a
"natural or adoptive parent" consents to adoption by his or her spouse. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 117 (McKinney Supp. 1975) (emphasis added). This implies that prior adoptive parents
would otherwise be eliminated as potential heirs of the child.
81. Curry, Intestate Succession and Wills: A Comparative Analysis of Article II of the
Uniform Probate Code and the Law of Ohio, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 114, 126 (1973); O'Connell &
Effland, Intestate Succession and Wills; A Comparative Analysis of the Law of Arizona and
the Uniform Probate Code, 14 ARIZ. L. REv. 205, 219 (1972).
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IX. Illegitimacy
Ever since the common law first labelled him filius nullius,s" the
illegitimate child has been denigrated. Decedents' estate law is no
exception. Under early New York law the inheritance rights of the
illegitimate child were severely restricted. He could only inherit
from his mother when she died leaving no lawful issue." Nothing
could pass to the illegitimate child from any of his mother's lawful
kindred. 4 Never was there any inheritance from or through the fa-
ther."
The practice of withholding rights from illegitimate children is
predicated on the belief that, by so doing, prohibited social behavior
will more effectively be deterred. The efficacy of this policy is highly
questionable and it has undoubtedly created undeserved hardships
by "punish[ing] illegitimate children for the misdeeds of their par-
ents."se
Recently New York has moved to restore certain rights to illegiti-
mate children by decreasing the number of children labelled illegiti-
mate and by increasing their inheritance rights.87 Since 1965 New
York law has treated the illegitimate child as a legitimate offspring
of the mother and permitted inheritance in both directions among
the child, mother, and maternal kindred.8 If there is a judicial
82. In re Cady's Estate, 257 App. Div. 129, 130, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (3d Dep't), aft'd,
281 N.Y. 688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *248.
83. Decedent Estate Law § 89, ch. 18, § 89, [1909] N.Y. Laws 14, as amended, Act of
April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [1929] N.Y. Laws 504 (repealed 1965). Until 1929 the legitimate
descendants of an illegitimate child could not inherit from the mother even if she died without
lawful issue. Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [1929] N.Y. Laws 504 (repealed 1965).
84. In re Cady's Estate, 257 App. Div. 129, 12 N.Y.S.2d 750 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 281 N.Y.
688, 23 N.E.2d 18 (1939). The only exception to this rule allowed the illegitimate child to
inherit when the intestate was another illegitimate offspring of his mother. In re Karenius'
Estate, 170 Misc. 652, 11 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Sur. Ct. 1939). When the illegitimate child himself
was the intestate, his mother and maternal kindred were allowed to succeed to his property
as if he were a legitimate child, subject of course to the rights of his widow and descendants.
Decedent Estate Law § 98(9), ch. 18, § 98(9), [1909] N.Y. Laws 14, as amended, Act of April
1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [19291 N.Y. Laws 504 (repealed 1965).
85. Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 668, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798 (Fain. Ct. 1947) (suit to
establish paternity).
86. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 557 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). "It is certainly
unusual in this country for a person to be legally disadvantaged on the basis of factors over
which he never had any control." Id. at 557-58.
87. Act of July 9, 1965, ch. 958, § 1, [1965] N.Y. Laws 2220 (now N.Y. EST., POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967)).
88. The surviving spouse or issue of the illegitimate child may also inherit as if he were
legitimate. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(b) (McKinney 1967).
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finding of paternity and an order of filiation89 entered in a proceed-
ing instituted either during the pregnancy of the mother or within
two years of the child's birth, the child and father may inherit from
each other. However, kindred of the father still do not share inheri-
tance rights with the child.9"
In an effort to reduce the number of children considered illegiti-
mate, New York modified the traditional legitimation procedure in
1969. Prior to that time a marriage between the parents of a child,
either before or after his birth, had to be valid to legitimatize the
child.' Under the revised statute any marriage, even if void, voida-
ble, or annulled, will confer upon a child of that union the status of
legitimacy.2
The process of restoring and protecting the rights of illegitimate
children is given further impetus by the Uniform Probate Code's
provision on illegitimacy and intestate succession, section 2-
109(2)."3 As in the New York statute, the illegitimate child is, for the
89. The constitutionality of requiring an order of filiation as a condition on the right of
an illegitimate child to succeed to his father's estate has been upheld in New York. In re
Estate of Belton, 70 Misc. 2d 814, 335 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Sur. Ct. 1972). But the same provision
has been held invalid to deny participation in a wrongful death recovery. Holden v. Alexan-
der, 39 App. Div. 2d 476, 336 N.Y.S.2d 649 (2d Dep't 1972) (father recovering for illegitimate
daughter's death); In re Johnson's Estate, 75 Misc. 2d 502, 348 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sur. Ct. 1973).
This split follows the line drawn by the Supreme Court as to what type of statute discrimi-
nates against illegitimates. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), gave the states broad
discretion in dealing with the rights of illegitimates under statutes of descent and distribu-
tion. In contrast, earlier decisions, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), and Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), had held that the equal protection clause
would not allow a state to discriminate against illegitimate children or their parents in
wrongful death actions.
90. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRusTs LAW §§ 4-1.2(a)(2), (b) (McKinney 1967).
91. Act of April 17, 1961, ch. 843, § 1, [19611 N.Y. Laws 2346 (repealed 1969).
92. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24 (McKinney Supp. 1974) (originally enacted as Act of April
30, 1969, ch. 325, § 1, [19691 N.Y. Laws 1074).
93. Section 2-109 (Meaning of Child and Related Terms) of the Code reads as follows:
If, for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child must be
established to determine succession by, through, or from a person,
(2) In cases not covered by (1), a person born out of wedlock is a child of the
mother. That person is also a child of the father, if:
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the birth
of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father or
is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, except that the paternity estab-
lished under this subparagraph (ii) is ineffective to qualify the father or his kindred to
inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated the child as his,
and has not refused to support the child.
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purposes of intestate succession, a child of the mother. This means
full inheritance rights flow among the child, mother, and maternal
kindred.
For the illegitimate child to be a child of the father, conditions
similar to those in the New York statutes must be met. First, a
marriage ceremony before or after the birth of the child will estab-
lish inheritance rights among the child, father, and paternal kindred
even if the marriage is void. 4 Alternatively, under the Code an
adjudication establishing paternity will create rights of inheritance
in the child. 5 Here, there is some procedural variation from New
York law. The Code sets no time limit after birth for instituting the
paternity proceeding. Adjudications of paternity would even be al-
lowed after the father's death if paternity could be established by
clear and convincing proof. The purpose of this provision is to pre-
vent the neglect of others from jeopardizing the child's opportunity
to attain the status of a legitimate offspring.
Even where an adjudication of paternity is made, the right of the
father and paternal kindred to inherit from or through the child is
not assured. The father must have openly treated the child as his
own and must not have refused to support him. Rarely would distri-
bution to an unresponsive father approximate the intent of an illegi-
timate child. With the exceptions (1) of the possibility of inheri-
tance by and from paternal kindred and (2) of the longer time al-
lowed in which to file paternity suits, the Code's treatment of the
right of illegitimate persons to succeed to intestate property is simi-
lar in all respects to New York.
X. Advancements
Under early statutes in England and this country, inter vivos gifts
by a parent to a child that were not made in discharge of parental
obligations reduced that child's intestate share, unless the parent
manifested a contrary intent. 6 Due in part to increased inter vivos
94. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-109(2)(i).
95. Id. § 2-109(2)(ii).
96. The English Statute of Distribution of 1670, 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 10, § 5 served as the
model for New York's advancement statute. See Beebe v. Estrabrook, 79 N.Y. 246, 250 (1879).
Although the statute did not require that every gift from parent to child be considered an
advancement, there arose a judicial presumption that any sizable transfer implied an intent
to anticipate the child's share of the parent's estate. Id. at 254. Nevertheless, the New York
statute had expressly exempted "maintaining or educating a child" from possible advance-
ment treatment. Decedent Estate Law, § 89, ch. 18, § 89, [1909] N.Y. Laws 14, as amended,
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transfers and their role in estate planning," and in part to problems
of proving intent, both New York and drafters of the Uniform Pro-
bate Code re-examined the doctrine of advancements. New York
reversed the statutory connotation of an inter vivos gift by providing
that neither a bequest in a will nor an intestate share will be dimin-
ished unless there is a contemporaneous writing by the donor or
donee acknowledging such diminution."8 Along with this curb on the
unintentional use of the doctrine, New York extended the class of
persons subject to a possible advancement of their testate or intes-
tate share to include any distributee or beneficiary, not just those
to whom the decedent stood in loco parentis." The Code in section
2-110'°° requires a contemporaneous writing by donor or donee to
establish the intent to charge an inter vivos gift against the heir's
interest in the donor's estate.
To calculate the effect of an advancement on intestate shares, the
usual procedure is to add the amount of the advancement to the
estate's assets available for distribution, to divide that total accord-
ing to the percentage due each distributee, and then to deduct the
amount advanced from the donee's share. To illustrate, assume that
two nephews and a niece whose aunt died intestate are the sole
distributees of a net estate worth $39,000. If the niece received a
$6,000 inter vivos gift as an advancement, the estate will yield
shares of $15,000 for each nephew and $9,000 for the niece. New
York mandates the use of this procedure'01 and, while the Code does
Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [1929] N.Y. Laws 504.
97. "Most inter vivos transfers today are intended to be absolute gifts or are carefully
integrated into a total estate plan." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-110, Comment.
98. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 2-1.5 (McKinney 1967).
99. Id. § 2-1.5(a).
100. Section 2-110 (Advancements) of the Code reads as follows:
If a person dies intestate as to all his estate, property which he gave in his lifetime
to an heir is treated as an advancement against the latter's share of the estate only if
declared in a contemporaneous writing by the decedent or acknowledged in writing by
the heir to be an advancement. For this purpose the property advanced is valued as of
the time the heir came into possession or enjoyment of the property or as of the time
of death of the decedent, whichever first occurs. If the recipient of the property fails
to survive the decedent, the property is not taken into account in computing the
intestate share to be received by the recipient's issue, unless the declaration or ac-
knowledgment provides otherwise.
The Code treats satisfaction in will situations separately in section 2-612.
101. N.Y. EST., POWERS & Trusts Law § 2-1.5(c) (McKinney 1967). There is also a safe-
guard provision in section 2-1.5(e) to prevent the addition of such "fictitious" assets to the
total estate from affecting the elective share of a surviving spouse.
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not on its face require it, the comment to section 2-110 recognizes
the general acceptance of the method of computation.'
Two aspects of the law of advancements are accorded different
treatment by New York and the Code. The first variation is slight.
Under section 2-110 of the Code an advancement to a donee who
later predeceases the decedent will not be allowed to diminish the
intestate shares of the donee's issue. This is contrary to the practice
of most jurisdictions.'"' Until 1966, New York, firmly with the ma-
jority, allowed the advancement' to be charged to descendants of a
child predeceasing the intestate. 104 The current New York statute,
although susceptible to ambiguity, appears to mandate a similar
result.' ° The Code's position, treating the issue of a donee as takers
in their own right, comports with restrictions placed on the inad-
vertent use of the advancement doctrine. If the donor/intestate de-
sires to charge the donee's issue, it is no great burden to expect some
manifestation of that intent in a contemporaneous writing.
The primary divergence of the Code's advancement provision
from New York law concerns the time of the valuation of the gift.
The Code 'Usually evaluates the inter vivos gift as of the time the
heir came into possession.'' New York prefers to evaluate the gift
102. "The statute does not spell out the method of taking account of the advance, since
this process is well settled by the common law and is not a source of litigation." UNIFORM
PROBATE CODE § 2-110, Comment.
103. Elbert, Advancements: III, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 535, 555-57 (1954). This result is either
prescribed by statute or attributed to the theory of representation.
104. "[Sluch child and his descendants shall receive so much only ...as shall be suffi-
cient to make all the shares of all the children in the whole property, including the advance-
ment, equal." Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [1929] N.Y. Laws 504 (emphasis added);
see Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246 (1879).
105. "[Tlhe donee or his successor in interest may take his intestate share or testamen-
tary interest reduced by the amount of the advancement." N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 2-1.5(c) (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added); see N.Y. TEMPORARY STATE COMM'N ON THE
MODERNIZATION, REVISION AND SIMPLIFICATION OF THE LAW OF ESTATES, FIFTH REPORT 525-26,
696-701 (1966). It appears that "successor in interest" was added to accommodate the
broader class of distributees affected by the new advancement statute. New York has inter-
preted its anti-lapse statute as requiring the deduction of an advancement from the shares
of issue of a beneficiary who predeceased the intestate. In re Offermann's Estate, 160 Misc.
787, 291 N.Y.S. 447 (Sur. Ct. 1936), off'd, 251 App. Div. 791, 298 N.Y.S. 166 (4th Dep't 1937).
In this case, testator had made equal advancements to her three children. After the death of
one child just prior to his mother's death, the issue of the predeceased child claimed that their
shares should not be reduced by the advancement. The court allowed the executor to count
the advancement against the grandchildren. Id. at 789, 298 N.Y.S. at 449. The drafters of
the Code acknowledge that this is the proper result in the case of wills, due to the action of
the anti-lapse statute. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-612, Comment.
106. If the death of the decedent occurs before the heir comes into possession or enjoyment
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as it is or would be appraised for estate tax purposes, unless the
contemporaneous writing specifies otherwise.'"7 The latter ap-
proach, appraising the gift closer to the time of the intestate's death,
puts the heirs in a more equal monetary position' 8 and has the
added benefit of a more readily ascertained value. Both of these
reasons, lessening the difficulty of evaluation and adhering to the
fundamental rationale of the advancement concept, indicate the
preferability of the New York approach. While some of the practical
difficulties may be eased by the description of the gift implicit in
the requirement of a contemporaneous writing, the Code's use of the
earlier time of valuation detracts from the desirability of enacting
section 2-110 in New York.
XI. Distributee's Debts to Decedent
Section 2-111, of the Uniform Probate Code provides that debts
of the distributees owed to the intestate will only be charged against
the share of the debtor.' 9 In cases where the debtor dies before
qualifying as an heir, section 2-111 expressly prohibits charging the
debt to the decedent against the intestate share of the debtor's
issue. This clear precept on debts owed to an intestate stands in
contrast to the Code's ambiguity on the treatment of debts owed to
a testator by a predeceased devisee whose issue take under the anti-
lapse statute."' New York case law prohibits a beneficiary from
claiming his share until all the obligations to the estate are satis-
of the property, the gift will be valued as of this earlier date. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-
110.
107. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.5(d)(2) (McKinney 1967). Until 1966 New
York had valued the gift as of the date of transfer. Act of April 1, 1929, ch. 229, § 6, [1929]
N.Y. Laws 504.
108. The theory underlying the advancement doctrine is "the accomplishment of equality
in participation between the children of an intestate." In re Singer's Estate, 171 Misc. 509,
510, 13 N.Y.S.2d 37, 39 (Sur. Ct. 1939).
109. Section 2-111 (Debts to Decedents) of the Code reads as follows:
A debt owed to the decedent is not charged against the intestate share of any person
except the debtor. If the debtor fails to survive the decedent, the debt is not taken into
account in computing the intestate share of the debtor's issue.
110. The comment to section 2-111 of the Code states that 2-111 supplements section 3-
903, which calls for the personal representative to offset from any successor's interest in the
estate the amount of the indebtedness owed to the estate by that person. However, neither
3-903 nor section 2-605, the Code's anti-lapse provision, explicitly addresses the question of
charging a debt to issue of a deceased devisee/debtor. The better inference drawn from these
two sections indicates an affirmative answer; if so, the Code is treating testate and intestate
situations differently.
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fled."' To accomplish this, the executor or administrator may retain
all or a portion of a debtor's interest in the estate to offset debts
owed to the estate or to the decedent."' The portion of the debtor's
share thus retained is not added ratably to the shares of the other
distributees; but, as in the case of advancements, the amount of the
debt increases the total value of the estate for the purposes of divi-
sion and is then deducted from the debtor's share." 3
On the question of charging the debts against the intestate shares
of the debtor's issue, New York has no clear guidelines. However,
in a case involving a will, where the issue of the debtor were saved
a legacy by the anti-lapse statute, the court offset the debt from the
bequest."' This would not necessitate similar results in cases of
intestacy where the issue of a debtor take their intestate portions
in their own right.
XII. Rights of Aliens
New York allows a nonresident alien to inherit property from a
New York decedent." 5 However, if that alien resides in a country
which is subject to certain fiscal sanctions by the United States or
if that alien would not have "the benefit or use or control" of the
inheritance, than his share will be held by the court for the alien's
benefit."' If there is any uncertainty on this point, the burden of
proving that the recipient will have the benefit of the funds is on
the recipient."7
The Uniform Probate Code goes further. Section 2-112 abolishes
all distinctions between an alien and a domestic heir."8 The primary
reason for this position is the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Zschernig v. Miller"' which considered an Oregon statute
providing for escheat of dispositions to nonresident aliens unless
111. In re Van Nostrand's Will, 177 Misc. 1, 7, 29 N.Y.S.2d 857, 864 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
112. In re Bradley, 122 Misc. 184, 203 N.Y.S. 490 (Sur. Ct. 1924); In re Robinson, 45 Misc.
551, 92 N.Y.S. 967 (Sur. Ct. 1904).
113. In re Cordier's Estate, 168 Misc. 577, 582, 6 N.Y.S.2d 270, 274 (Sur. Ct. 1938).
114. In re Metz' Estate, 184 Misc. 8, 52 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sur. Ct. 1944). The New York court
viewed the loan creating the debt as similar to an advancement, which was, at that time,
chargeable to the issue's share. See note 105 supra.
115. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 10(2) (McKinney 1968).
116. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. LAW § 2218(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
117. Id. § 2218(3).
118. "No person is disqualified to take as an heir because he or a person through whom
he claims is or has been an alien." UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, § 2-112 (Alienage).
119. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
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reciprocity of inheritance rights and absence of "confiscation" were
shown. 2 ' The Court held that, in applying the statute, the Oregon
courts' practice of carefully examining the foreign country's in-
volvement in the transmittal of an inheritance to an alien was un-
constitutional as "an intrusion by the State into the field of foreign
affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and the
Congress.""'
Despite this pronouncement, it is arguable that not all state stat-
utes fall within the Oregon statute. The New York Court of Appeals
subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the state's "benefit or
use or control""' statute, instructing the lower courts to curtail any
detailed investigation of foreign practice.' 3 Soon thereafter, a panel
of three federal judges upheld the current version of the New York
statute against claims of unconstitutionality on grounds of unwar-
ranted interference in foreign affairs,' 4 denial of due process,' 5 and
denial of equal protection.' 6
The Code's restriction on state control over the inheritance rights
120. Id. at 430 n.l.
121. Id. at 432. Two members of the Court found the statute unconstitutional on its face.
Id. at 442 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Brennan, J.). Two other justices found the law
constitutional as applied. Id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring), 462 (White, J., dissenting).
122. In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Laikind v. Attorney General of New York, 397 U.S. 148 (1970).
This case was decided before the amendment of New York's alien statute in 1968, see id.,
and therefore the court of appeals was not confronted with new paragraph one of the statute
which deals with aliens in countries on the United States Treasury List. N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO.
LAW § 2218(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975).
123. "Thus, if the courts of this State, in applying the 'benefit or use or control' require-
ments, simply determine, without animadversions, whether or not a foreign country, by
statute or otherwise, prevents its residents from actually sharing in the estates of New York
decedents, the statute would not be unconstitutional under the explicit rationale of the
Zschernig case." In re Estate of Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 352, 239 N.E.2d 550, 553, 292
N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (1968), appeal dismissed sub nom. Laikind v. Attorney General of New
York, 397 U.S. 148 (1970). Zschernig, reaffirming an earlier decision, allows "a routine reading
of foreign laws" to evaluate the conditions on an alien's inheritance rights. 389 U.S. at 433.
124. Bjarsch v. DiFalco, 314 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). This decision rules on the new
paragraph one of section 2218 of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act, but the court noted
that the Treasury List which that paragraph utilizes as a "confiscation" guideline now in-
cludes only Albania and the German Democratic Republic. Id. at 130 n.2.
125. The panel dissipated the due process challenge by reading into the statute a require-
ment that the court grant a hearing if beneficiaries apply for withdrawal of the funds depos-
ited with the court. Id. at 135.
126. Use of the Treasury List as a rebuttable presumption of confiscatory policies was
"not arbitrary or unreasonable and the differentiation does relate to the legitimate purpose
of the statute." Id. at 136.
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of an alien is more pervasive than Zschernig demands. States should
be permitted to exercise as much control as is consistent with
Zschernig.2 7 New York has attempted to do so,128 but an excess of
caution may be inhibiting the proper degree of judicial involve-
ment.2 9 On balance, New York's delicate approach to the problem
is preferable to Code section 2-112 which, in effect, removes all state
supervision.
XIII. Dower and Curtesy
Section 2-113 of the Uniform Probate Code extinguishes the es-
tates of dower and curtesy.13 ° Modern statutory safeguards against
disinheritance of a spouse have largely usurped the role of these
common law estates.' 3' Their failure to accomplish the purposes for
which they were created and the impediment to real estate transac-
tions which they create weigh heavily against them. New York abol-
ished the estate of curtesy' 2 and curtailed the right of dower'33 in
127. As Justice Harlan, concurring in the Zschernig result, noted:
[I]n the absence of a conflicting federal policy or violation of the express mandates
of the Constitution, the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence
even though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations.
389 U.S. at 458-59.
128. See note 123 supra. New York's legislative response to Zschernig was the addition of
a new paragraph to the statute. Act of June 22, 1968, ch. 998, § 1, [1968] N.Y. Laws 1985,
amending N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO. LAW § 2218 (McKinney 1967) (codified at N.Y. SURR. CT. PRO.
LAW § 2218(1) (McKinney Supp. 1975)). This amendment was intended to "substantially
support the New York statute from a constitutional point of view." Memorandum of State
Dep't of Law, Surrogate's Court-Deposit in Court for Benefit of Legatee, Distributee, or
Beneficiary, N.Y. Sess. Laws 2326, 2327 (McKinney 1968). Apparently, the insertion of the
Treasury List as a guideline was meant to reduce the intensity of judicial inquiry into the
"benefit or use or control" question.
129. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hajridin, 40 App. Div. 2d 685, 336 N.Y.S.2d 265 (2d Dep't
1972) (mem.), a/I'd, 33 N.Y.2d 955, 309 N.E.2d 131, 353 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1974) (mem.), (allow-
ing, without much discussion, Albanian heirs to inherit notwithstanding Albania's pres-
ence on the Treasury List). For an interesting example of the type of time consumi'ng and
politically sensitive research these questions entail, see In re Estate of Danilchenko, 37 App.
Div. 2d 587, 588, 323 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (2d Dep't 1971) (mem.) (Benjamin, J., dissenting),
af'd, 30 N.Y.2d 504, 280 N.E.2d 650, 329 N.Y.S.2d 820 (1972). In fact, although the New York
statute applies to legatees as well as distributees, it has been held that a testator may leave
the "benefit" question to the discretion of his executor. The executor's decision, if made in
good faith, is binding on the court, entirely circumventing judicial intervention. Id. This is
a questionable grant of discretion.
130. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 2-113.
131. See Kossow, Probate Law and the Uniform Code: "One for the Money. ,61 GEo.
L.J. 1357, 1381-93, 1383 n.172 (1973).
132. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 189 (McKinney 1968).
133. Id. § 190 (McKinney 1968).
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1930.13 Further diminishing the value of dower, the statute on intes-
tate succession provides that any share passing intestate to the
widow of a decedent shall be in lieu of dower. 135 The widow must
elect between her dower rights and her intestate share. 136 The power
of the legislature to abolish the right of dower is recognized in New
York 37 and, after nearly fifty years of letting the light grow dim, it
would be appropriate to extinguish it completely.
XIV. Conclusion
Is the Uniform Probate Code's law of intestate succession an im-
petus or an impediment to adoption by New York of the entire
Code? This is the bottom line question. Earlier it was said that the
enactment of this part of the code rested upon a critique of section
2-102, the intestate share of the surviving spouse. It was just con-
cluded that there existed persuasive social and economic justifica-
tion for the Code's enhanced allocation to the spouse.
Although section 2-102 is the single most important reason for
acceptance of the Code's law of intestate succession, it does not
stand alone. The requirement of survivorship for 120 hours, a signifi-
cant change that section 2-104 would bring to New York law, is a
distinct plus because it would lessen attendant evidentiary prob-
lems. The increased use of inheritance by representation among the
descendants of grandparents, section 2-109(2), is an additional tally
in the affirmative column.
Certain features of this part of the Code compare unfavorably
with current New York law. Two examples of this are New York's
more sophisticated approach to inheritance by nonresident aliens
and to the time of the valuation of advancements. As to the remain-
ing major topics of intestacy law, the share of heirs other than the
surviving spouse and the relationship of adoption and intestate suc-
cession, there is little difference between the Code and New York
law.
The final analysis reveals that, on balance, the Uniform Probate
Code's treatment of intestate succession is preferable to present
134. The only vestige of dower remaining is the right of a widow, married to decedent
before September 1, 1930, to one-third of all land of which her husband was seized both prior
to September 1, 1930, and during their marriage. Id.
135. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(g) (McKinney 1967).
136. In re Hume's Will, 139 Misc. 327, 332, 248 N.Y.S. 415, 421 (Sur. Ct. 1931).
137. 7 re Bachmann's Estate, 151 Misc. 761, 762, 272 N.Y.S. 467, 469 (Sur. Ct. 1934).
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New York law. To the already well known reasons supporting the
entire Code (nationwide uniformity of probate law, greater ease of
administration, substantive improvements in the law of decedents'
estates, and others), there should be added these words of Plato:
"Otherwise they will spend their lives making a host of petty regula-
tions and amending them in hope of reaching perfection."'' 8
138. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 116 (F. Cornford transl. i941).
